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Abstract. The subject of this paper is the authentication services as 
found in the J(uperee3 server. The authentication protocol is based on the 
Zheng-Seberry public key cryptosystem, and makes use of the distinct 
features of the cryptosystem. Although couched in the terminology of 
Kerberos, the protocol has subtle features, such as the binding together 
of two entities by a third entity, leading to the need of equal co-operation 
by the two entities in order to complete the authentication procedure. 
Another important feature is the use of a multi-service ticket to access 
multiple services offered by differen t servers. This removes the need of 
the Client to consult the Trusted Authority each time it needs a service 
from a Server. In addition, this allows an increased level of parallelism 
in which several Servers may be concurrently executing applications on 
behalf of a single Client. The scheme is also extendible to cover a more 
global scenario in which several realms exist, each under the care of a 
trusted authority. Finally, the algorithms that implement the scheme are 
presented in terms of the underlying cryptosystem. Although the scheme 
currently employs a public key cryptosystem, future developments of the 
server may combine private key cryptosystems to enhance performance. 
1 Introduction 
In the last two decades an explosion of interest have been shown in the use of 
cryptographic techniques to provide some solutions to the problems of infor-
mation security. Previously, the study of these techniques was confined only 
to within the military and intelligence communities, with the primary non-
government application being in the banking sector. However, more recently 
these techniques have been widely recognized and appreciated as being crucial 
to security and they have been incorporated into the more general computing 
and information systems environments. Specialized architectures providing for 
specific security services have found realization within the client-server paradigm. 
3 J( uperee is a mythical enormous black kangaroo in the Dreamtime Myths of the 
Australian Aboriginal people. It moves at a high speed, and leaves havoc and terror 
wherever it goes. 
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The two types of servers that have emerged corresponding to the two ap-
proaches in cryptographic techniques are Authentication Servers, which embody 
private-key cryptosystems, and Certification Servers, which rely on public-key 
cryptosystems. Both types of servers provide for services relating to the secrecy 
of communications and interactions between entities, and for the authentication 
of one entity by another. The development of these servers represent the bridg-
ing stage from systems with little integrated security features to systems with 
security as one of their major design considerations. With most of the secure 
systems being expensive and less compatible with existing systems, the notion 
of a bridging server that provide for secrecy and authentication is an attractive 
one. 
In the past few years a number of systems for authentication services have 
been developed, among others the Kerberos authentication service [1,2,3] within 
Project Athena at MIT [4], SP X [5, 6] as part of the DEC's Distributed Systems 
Security Architecture (DSSA) [6] and Sesame [7,8, 9] within ECMA's standard 
for security framework. 
Kerberos adopts the private (shared) key approach, and is a trusted third-
party authentication service developed from the Needham-Schroeder protocol [10] 
which has subsequently been improved and shown to be reliable [11, 12]. The 
Kerberos authentication service provides a trusted intermediary between a User 
or Client that requires services from a Server. It authenticates the User or Client 
by way of a shared private key, and it provides a way for the Server to authen-
ticate the User or Client when it request the services of the Server. 
Due to the use of private key cryptography, the Kerberos authentication 
service requires a key to be shared between the User or Client and the trusted 
authorities in the system, namely the Key Distribution Center (KDC) and the 
Ticket Granting Server (TGS) [3]. This, however, requires a great amount of 
trust to be placed on the implementation of the trusted authorities, since their 
compromise results in possible masquerade by the attacker of the User or Client 
whose private key are stored with these trusted authorities [13]. 
In this paper we discuss the authentication service provided by the Kuperee 
server. The authentication protocol is based on the Zheng-Seberry public key 
cryptosystem [14], and makes use of the distinct features of the cryptosystem. 
In general, the use of a public key cryptosystem provides an advantage in terms 
of the trust level expected from a server [15]. That is, a server based on a pub-
lic key cryptosystem would hold certified public keys of Users and/or Clients, 
and thus the compromise of the server does not lead to the compromise of the 
corresponding secret keys. 
Although couched in the terminology of Kerberos, Kuperee has a number 
of subtle features, such as the binding together of two entities by a third entity, 
leading to the need of equal co-operation by the two entities in order to complete 
the authentication procedure. That is, a Ticket Granting Server has the ability 
to bind together a Client and the Server that is providing the Client with some 
services. In this case the Server cannot proceed without the cooperation of the 
Client in the form of the client submitting a cryptographic authenticator to the 
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server. The authenticator in this case is not an enciphered piece of information 
(as in Kerberos), but rather it is a cryptographic component that contributes to 
the successful authentication by the Server. This paper also focuses on a feature 
of the scheme in which one multi-service ticket can be used by a Client to access 
multiple Servers, thereby reducing the need of the Client to continually prompt 
the TGS for service tickets. This allows an increased level of parallelism in which 
several Servers may be concurrently executing applications on behalf of a single 
Client. The scheme is also extendible to cover a more global scenario in which 
several realms exist, each under the care of a Trusted Authority. 
Although we initially model our approach on Kerberos and employ its lan-
guage in our discussions, we by no means limit ourselves to the use of the un-
derlying cryptosystem following the steps of Kerberos. The underlying public 
key cryptosystem has more to offer and future developments of Kuperee will 
address more efficient ways to achieve authentication than currently presented 
in this paper. Efforts such as in SPX [5] clearly show that better performance 
and security may be achieved by combining suitable implementations of both 
public key and private key cryptosystems. 
In the next section (Section 2) for the sake of clarity we briefly summarize the 
Kerberos authentication service (version 5) as described in [3]. Readers unfamil-
iar with Kerberos are directed to [1, 3] for more details on its implementation. 
In Section 3 we preseht our approach using the public key cryptosystem of [14]. 
This is continued in Section 4 by the description of our method to generate a 
multi-service ticket for multiple services. The algorithms that implement our 
approach are then given in Section 5. The flexibility of our approach is further 
illustrated in Section 6 by inter-realm authentication in a hierarchically orga-
nized realms or domains, each managed by a TGS. Section 7 briefly discusses 
the security level achieved by our solution, while the paper is finally closed In 
Section 8 by some concluding remarks. 
2 Kerberos authentication service 
In the Kerberos authentication system [1, 3] the entities that interact with the 
authentication service are called principals. The term can be used for Users, 
Clients or Servers. Commonly, a user directs a Client (eg. a program) on a 
machine to request a service provided by a Server on a remote machine. The 
Server itself is usually a process on the remote machine, and different services 
are usually taken to be available on differing remote machines. Kerberos employs 
two types of credentials to achieve authentications, namely the tickets of the form 
{s, c, addr, timestamp, lif etime, Ks ,c} 
and the authenticators of the form 
{c, addr, timestamp} 
which is enciphered using a key common to the issuer and the recipient. Here the 
ticket consists of the Server and Client identities, followed by the Client's network 
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address, a unique timestamp, the lifetime of the ticket and finally by the common 
key to be shared between the Server and the Client [1]. In this example, the ticket 
contains the key K.,e shared between the Client c and the Server s. The Server 
is trusted to generate such shared keys and when the ticket is to be given to a 
Client c then it must be enciphered using the Client's key Kc. In the remainder of 
the paper we will employ the notation used for Kerberos in [1, 3] with respect to 
the encipherment/decipherment operation. That is, the operation "OK" means 
that the contents within the braces "0" are enciphered/deciphered using the 
key K (Section 5 gives the precise algorithms for the encipherment/ decipherment 
operations) . 
In brief, the interactions within the authentication service consists of the 
Client requesting the Key Distribution Center (KDC) for a ticket-granting ticket 
to be submitted by the Client to the Ticket Granting Server (TGS). The TGS 
then issues the Client with a service ticket which has a shorter lifetime com-
pared to the ticket-granting ticket. The service ticket is then used by the Client 
to request the services of the Server which is mentioned in the ticket. These 
two stages are also referred to as the credential-initialization and client-server 
authentication protocols respectively in [13]. 
: ................................................................. . 
co-located 
I--S-----.. • 8 
Fig. 1. Obtaining a service ticket (after [3]) 
The actions of the Kerberos authentication service following the description 
of [3] is given in the following (Figure 1). 
1. Client --+ KDC: c, tgs 
2. KDC -+ Client: {I<c t9'}K ' {Te t9'}K 
, c ' tgB 
3. Client -+ TGS: {Ae} Ke,tg.' {Te,tg.} Ktg .' s 
4. TGS -+ Client: {KC"}Ke,tg,' {Te"}K, 
5. Client -+ Server: {Ache,.' {Tc,.} K. 
147 
6. Server ~ Client: {timestamp + Ih 
C,' 
In step 1 the Client c requests the Key Distribution Center (KDC) for an ini-
tial ticket and credentials to be presented to the Ticket Granting Server (TGS). 
In step 2 the KDC generates a session key /(e,tg. that will be shared between 
the Client and the TGS. A copy of this key is enciphered using the Client's key 
/(e to guarantee that the Client can obtain it securely. The ticket-granting ticket 
Te,tg. to be presented to the TGS by the Client already contains a copy of the 
session key /(e,tg.' Hence, both the Client and the TGS can later communicate 
securely using' this session key shared between them. Note that the ticket is 
enciphered using the TGS's private key /(tg. known only to the KDC and the 
TGS. 
In step 3 the Client then creates an authenticator Ae to be read only by the 
TGS (hence enciphered using /(e,tg.) and presents it to the TGS together with 
the ticket {Te,tg.} K'g. which the Client obtained from the KDC. 
On receiving the authenticator and ticket-granting ticket from the Client, the 
TGS deciphers and authenticates the ticket (step 4). The TGS then generates 
another session key /(e,. to be shared between the Client c and the Server s. The 
TGS also creates a service ticket destined for the Server. This ticket Te,. contains 
a copy of the new session key, and its lifetime is shorter than the lifetime of the 
initial ticket Te,lg.' The TGS knows the private key of every Server s, and ticket 
is made exclusively for the eyes of the Server by enciphering it using /( •. A copy 
of the session key /(e,. (hidden by enciphering it using /(e,lg.) accompanies the 
ticket to the Client. 
In step 5, the Client enciphers the authenticator Ae using the session key 
/(e,. which it will share with the Server s. This is then sent to the Server s 
together with the ticket obtained from the TGS. The Client may request the 
Server to prove its identity which can be achieved by the Server incrementing 
the timestamp value by one, and enciphering the result using the session key 
shared between the Server and the Client (step 6). 
3 Public key approach 
In this section we propose an approach based on public key cryptography. Our 
approach is founded on the public key cryptosystem of [14], and some of its 
constructs that are necessary for the current discussion will be presented in the 
following. The algorithms that implement the cryptosystem are deferred until 
Section 5 in order to simplify discussion. 
In the public key cryptosystem of [14] a secret key is chosen randomly and 
uniformly from the integers in [1 ,p-1], where the prime p is public and is used to 
generate the multiplicative group GF(p)* of the finite field GF(p). The generator 
of this multiplicative group is denoted as 9 and it is a publicly known value. This 
usage of 9 and p is inspired by notable works of [16] and [17]. The corresponding 
public key is then produced by using the secret key as the exponent of 9 modulo 
p. In the remainder of this paper all exponentiations are assumed to be done 
over the underlying groups. 
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For the current usage of the cryptosystem, assume that the secret and public 
key pairs of the principals are as follows. The KDC has the pair (Xkde, Ykde == 
gXkde), the Client has (xc, Ye == gXe), the TGS has (Xtg., Ytg• == gX,g,), while 
the Server has (X., Y. == gX.). The keys Ykde, Ye, Yt g• and Y. are known to the 
public as in other systems based on public key cryptography. 
Each session secret and public key pair is denoted by (k, /{ == gk), and 
their subscripts indicates which principals employ the key pair. Hence, the pair 
(ke,tg., /{e,tg.) is used for interactions between the Client and the TGS. In our 
case the tickets to be employed do not contain any keys, hence their form are: 
{s, c, addr, timestamp, lifetime} 
3.1 Getting an initial ticket 
1. Client -+ KDC: c, tgs 
2. KDC -+ Client: /{e,tg., Ce,tg. 
The KDC first generates the session key pair (ke,tgs, J{ e,tgs) to be used be-
tween the Client and the TGS. 
The cryptogram Ce,tgs is the ticket-granting ticket Te,tgs being enciphered 
as: 
where 
r = (y v )Xkde+ke"g. e,tgs - e L tgs (1) 
3. Client -+ TGS: Ae,tg., /{e,tg., Ce,tg., S 
On receiving the enciphered ticket Ce,tg. together with its accompanying 
session public key /{e,tg. the Client computes a Authenticator Ac,tg.: 
(2) 
The authenticator, the received session public key and enciphered ticket-
granting ticket, and the identity of the destination Server s are then delivered 
to the TGS. 
The TGS employs the session public key /{e,tgs to compute its Decryptor 
Dtgs,c as: 
D - (V}'' )x,g. tg. ,e = L kdc \.c,tgs (3) 
This is then used to recreate the key "e,tga that was used by the KDC to 
encipher the ticket: 
The resulting key re,tg' is then used to recover the ticket Te,tg.' 
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3.2 Getting a service ticket 
In order to obtain the services of the Server the Client must obtain a service 
ticket from the TGS to be presented to the Server. We continue the procedure 
in the following steps. 
4. TGS -> Client: /{e,., Ce,. 
In order to encipher the service ticket Te ,. the TGS must generate the session 
key pair (ke,.'!<e,.) which is used as follows: 
Ce,. == {Te,. like,.} r e._ 
where 
r = (y y)X,g.+ke ., 
C,3 - C " 
resulting in the cryptogram Ce , •. 
The cryptogram Ce,. and the session public key /{e,. are then delivered to 
the Client. 
5. Client -> Server: Ae,., /{ e,., Ce,. 
As when dealing with the TGS, the Client must compute the authenticator 
Ae,. indicating its desire to use the service provided by the Server: 
This authenticator, the received session public key and enciphered service 
ticket are then presented to the Server whenever the Client requires the 
serVIce. 
On first being presented with the (enciphered) service ticket, the Server must 
compute its corresponding decryptor 
D.,e == (Yi g• /{e,.l-
The Server is then able to recreate the session key r e,. as: 
to be used to obtain {Te,.IIke,.}. 
6. Server --+ Client: {timestamp + l}r 
•• e 
If required, the Server may respond to the Client's request of proving the 
Server's identity. This can be done by the Server reusing the key k e ,. that 
was enciphered together with the service ticket Te, •. The key is reused to 
create r.,c as: 
r.,e == (Ye)X.+k e •• 
to encipher {timestamp + I}. 
The Client can recreate the key r.,e as: 
r.,e == (I<e,. y.)X e 
which is then used to recover and check {timestamp + I}. 
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4 Multi-service ticket 
One interesting feature in Kuperee deriving from its usage of the public key 
cryptosystem of [14] is its ability to present Clients with one service-ticket which 
can be used with several Servers (Figure 2) This removes the need of the Client 
to consult the TGS each time it needs a service from a Server. In addition, 
this allows an increased level of parallelism in which several Servers may be 
concurrently executing applications on behalf of a single Client. The level of 
dependence of the Client on the TGS is also reduced since such multi-service 
tickets maybe given a longer life-time, hence reducing the impact on the system 
when the TGS is temporarily unavailable. 
:-._---_.-_ ......... -_ ......... -_ ............ _- ......... _-_ ...... ""; 




Fig. 2. Obtaining a multi-service ticket 
In this section the creation and use of the multi-service tickets is discussed. 
First, the TGS must be notified by the Client about the q Servers 51,52, ., ., 5 q 
that the Client wishes to access. We can repeat the last two steps (ie. steps 4 
and 5) as follows: 
M3. Client --+ TGS: Ae,tg., Ke,tg., Ce,tg., m = (S1, S2,"" Sq) 
M4. TGS --+ Client: Ke,m, Ce,m (Re,." Re, •• , .. ·, Re"q) 
The TGS prepares the service ticket Te,m, generates the key pair (ke,m, Kc,m) 
and enciphers the ticket into Ce,m: 




The TGS must also computer q number of selectors Rc,$" RC ,$2' ... , R C ,3 q 
which will be used by the Client to choose among the q specified Servers 
Sl, S2, ... ,Sq. These selectors are computed as: 
(y y ... Y )Xtg.+kc,~ ~2 33 $q 
(y Y ... Y )Xtg,+kc,~ "1 "'3 $q 
The cryptogram Cc,m, the session public key Kc,m and the selectors are then 
delivered to the client. 
M5. Client --+ Server Sv: Ac,m, Kc,m, Cc,m, R c,$ v 
As in the single-service case, the Client must compute its authenticator to 
be delivered to the Server. Thus, 
However, in this multi-service case, the Client must select the Server from 
which it requires service. Assuming that the Client requires service from 
Server Sv (1 ::; v ::; q), then the Client must employ the selector R c ,. v' 
This authenticator Ac,m, the received session public key Kc,m, the enciphered 
service ticket Cc,m and the selector Rc,$v must then be presented to the 
Server sv. 
On first being presented with the (enciphered) service ticket, the Server Sv 
must compute its corresponding decryptor 
The Server is then able to recreate the enciphering key rc,m as: 
to be used to decipher the service ticket Cc,m' 
5 Algorithms 
As described briefly in Section 3, our approach is based on the public key cryp-
tosystem of [14J. In this section we provide further notations for the cryptosys-
tern and present the algorithm for the encipherment and decipherment of tickets 
based on a modified version of the original cryptosystem of [14]. The algorithms 
expresses only the encipherment (decipherment) of the plaintext (ciphertext) 
tickets, and do not incorporate the steps taken by the KDC, Client, TGS and 
the Server. Hence, the reader is encouraged to read them in conjunction with 
the steps provided in Sections 3.2 and 3.1. 
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5.1 Notation 
The following notation is taken directly from [14]. The cryptosystem of [14] em-
ploys a n-bit prime p (public) and a generator 9 (public) of the multiplicative 
group GF(p)* of the finite field GF(p). Here n is a security parameter which 
is greater that 512 bits, while the prime p must be chosen such that p - 1 has 
a large prime factor. Concatenation of string are denoted using the "II" symbol 
and the bit-wise XOR operations of two strings is symbolized using "EEl". The 
notation W[i .. j] (i ::; j) is used to indicate the substring obtained by taking the 
bits of string W from the i-th bit (Wi) to the j-th bit (Wj). 
The action of choosing an element x randomly and uniformly from set S is 
denoted by XERS, G is a cryptographically strong pseudo-random string gener-
ator based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms in finite fields [14]. 
G stretches an n-bit input string into an output string whose length can be an 
arbitrary polynomial in n. This generator produces O(log n) bits output at each 
exponentiation. All messages to be encrypted are chosen from the set I;P(nl, 
where pen) is an arbitrary polynomial with pen) ~ n and where padding can 
be used for messages of length less than n bits. The polynomial e == e(n) spec-
ifies the length of tags. The function h is a one-way hash function compressing 
input strings into e-bit output strings. In the remainder of this paper all expo-
nentiations are assumed to be done over the underlying groups. The reader is 
directed to [14] for a comprehensive discussion on the constructs of the family 
of cryptosystems. 
5.2 Getting initial and service tickets 
In the process of getting an initial ticket the Clients asks the KDC to prepare 
the ticket to be submitted by the Client to the TGS. The KDC first performs 
ke,lg.ER[1,p - 1] followed by the calculation Ke,lg. == le"g,. The KDC then 
enciphers the ticket Te,lgs using the key r e,lgs by invoking Encipher (Algorithm 1) 
with the input parameters (p, g, re,lg" Te,lg.) resulting in the output Ce,lgS' 
Algorithm 1 Encipher(p, g, r, T) 
1. z == G(r)[l.(P(n)+l(nll]· 
2. t == h(T EEl r). 
3. m == (Tilt). 
4. C == z EEl m. 
5. output (C). 
end 
The KDC then sends the resulting ciphertext Ce,lgs and the session public key 
Ke,tgs to the Client who proceeds to compute Ae,tgs' These values are then sub-
mitted by the Client to the TGS who tries to decipher Ce,lgS' This is done by the 
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TGS first computing Dtgs,e and using it and the received values as input to De-
cipher (Algorithm 2). That is, the TGS inputs (p, g, Ae,tg., Ke,tg., Ce,tg., Dtg.,e) 
and receives the output Te,tg.' 
Algorithm 2 Decipher(p, g, A, K, C, D) 
end 
1. r' = AD. 
2. z' = G(r')[1,,(p(nl+l(nll]' 
3. m = z' EB C. 
4. T' = m[l ... P(nl]' 
5. t' = m[(P(nl+l)- .. (P(n)+l(nll]' 




The same procedure is followed by the TGS in enciphering the ticket to 
be submitted by the Client to the Server. The minor difference in this case is 
that the TGS appends a response key ke,. (ie. the secret half of the session 
key) to the ticket Te,s' This addition does not affect the algorithms and their 
security in any way. Hence, the TGS invokes Encipher (Algorithm 1) with the 
input parameters (p, g, r e," (Te,s like,s)) resulting in the output Ce, •. The Server 
deciphers Ce,s into (Te,s like,s) using Decipher (Algorithm 2) with input values 
(p, g, Ae,. iKe,., Ce,., D.,c)' 
6 Hierarchical inter-realm authentication 
The integration of security into distributed systems has introduced the need to 
manage the information pertaining to the security functions in the distributed 
system. The most common and important need is that of providing a method 
to manage cryptographic keys of the components in the distributed system. 
One approach that may be adopted is that of organizing the components into a 
hierarchy consisting of a number of domains or realms, each being managed by 
an independent trusted authority (eg. TGS). This approach has the advantage 
of the localized distribution of new keys, hence reducing the replication of keys 
across the entire distributed system. 
Within the context of our discussion a domain or realm can consist of Clients, 
Servers, a local managing TGS and of other TGSs that manage their own realms. 
In this manner, the components are organized into a hierarchy based on the 
TGSs, with each TGS managing a certain number of Clients, Servers and other 
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TGSs. A Client within a realm may request service from a Server in the same 
domain in the manner previously discussed. However, it is also natural for a 
Client to request service from a "foreign" Server which is located in a different 
realm on another part of the hierarchy. In this section we address inter-realm 
authentication together with some accompanying issues. Our approach is general 
enough to be applicable to a number of areas, one being the X.500 Directory 
Services [18]. 
A c 
~ .. , 
, , , . . . . , 
, ' , ' , ' , . 
.•.• I I I 
: I I I 
j : I.. Server : : 
___________ ';;::,-,;.'.:,'_1 I_~·.;.·.;.·.:.·..! __________ I I 
1 ______ -------------------------------------, 
Fig.3. A hierarchy of TGSs 
In our usage, a hierarchy is assumed to be a directed acyclic graph and each 
node in the hierarchy is assumed to have only one parent node. An example of 
such a hierarchy that will be used in the following discussions is given in Figure 3. 
In Figure 3 the Client is located in the domain or realm under the jurisdiction 
of the TGS A. The Client requires the service provided by a Server which is 
located within the realm of TGS C. In this case the TGS A must enroll the aid 
of its parent TGS B to forward the Client's request to TGS node C. Two general 
arrangements of the keys of the nodes in the hierarchy will be considered in the 
following. Note that the terms "TGS" and "node" will be used interchangeably 
to simplify discussion. In our example, we assume that the TGSs A, Band C 
have the key pairs (Xtg • a , Ytg.a) , (X tg• b , Ytg.b) and (X tg8C , Ytg8C) respectively. 
6.1 Localized keys 
One possible arrangement of keys in the hierarchy is based on their maintenance 
on a per realm basis. That is, in this arrangement a TGS node holds the public 
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key of only its parent node and all its children nodes. This arrangement is similar 
to the arrangement of directories in [19]. Using Figure 3 as an example, TGS 
node B has the public key of its parent and of TGS nodes A and C. However, B 
does not have the public keys of the descendants of TGS nodes A and C. In this 
situation the TGS node A must refer the Client to node A's parent, namely node 
B. The node B, not knowing the public key of the Server must then refer the 
Client to B's child node C. Since node C is the trusted authority of the realm 
in which the Server resides, node C knows the public key of the Server and thus 
can forward the Client's request to the Server. These steps are shown in the 
following (Figure 4). Note that in essence, the Client must interact with every 
TGS node between its own TGS node (A) and the common ancestor node (B), 
and between the common ancestor node and the destination's TGS node (C). 
The deeper the Client is located in the hierarchy from the common ancestor, the 
more interactions it has to perform in order to reach the destination. 
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Fig.4. Authentication with localized keys 
1. Client -> KDC: c, tgsa 
2. KDC -> Client: Ke,tgsa, Ce,tgsa 
3. Client -> TGS A: Ae,tgsa, Ke,tgsa, Ce,tgsa, S 
4. TGS A - Client: Ke,tgsb, Ce,tgsb 
5. Client -> TGS B: Ae,tgsb, /(e,tgsb, Ce,tgsb, S 
6. TGS B - Client: Ke,tgse', Ce,tgse 
7. Client - TGS C: Ae,tgsc, /(c,tgsc, Ce,tgH' S 
8. TGS C -> Client: Ke,s, Ce,s 
9. Client - Server: Ae-,s, Ke,s, Ce,s 




6.2 Globalized keys 
Another possible arrangement of keys in the hierarchy is a more globalized one, 
in which a node knows not only the public key of all its descendant nodes, but 
also the public key of all its ancestor nodes (bearing in mind that a node only 
has one parent). Here a node does not have the public keys of any of its sibling 
nodes nor that of their descendants. Although such a configuration is costly in 
terms of the number of messages to be delivered when a node generates a new 
public key, the gains occur during the interaction with nodes located in other 
realms. Note that in our approach the public keys are not distributed in a fully 
globalized manner. That is, since a node does not have the public keys of its 
siblings, it must request the aid of its parent when dealing with such siblings. 
However, the steps used in our approach can be modified in a straight-forward 
manner to suit cases in which a node has a copy of the public key of every other 
node in the hierarchy. 
Returning to our scenario where a Client requires the services offered by a 
foreign Server, the TGS in the Client's realm has more flexibility in issuing the 
enciphered ticket. Hence, with a TGS node knowing the public keys of all its 
ancestors, the node can find a common ancestor between itself and the TGS who 
manages the realm in which the Server resides. Looking back at Figure 3, the 
TGS node A (managing the Client's realm) and the TGS node C (managing the 
Server's realm) have a common ancestor (parent) in the TGS node B. 
In this case, the TGS node A must prepare the enciphered ticket to be deci-
pherable by the common ancestor (node B). This common ancestor node B must 
then locate the desired Server and re-encipher the ticket in such a way that it is 
decipherable by the Server with the necessary approval of the TGS within the 
Server's realm. That is, the ticket must be decipherable by the Server with the 
approval of the TGS node C in the form of node C sending a decryptor for the 
ticket to the Server. Note that only TGS A and C are involved with the common 
ancestor B, eventhough both TGSs A and C may have many other ancestors 
between them and TGS B respectively. Hence, in such a globalized key approach 
only a maximum of three TGSs (A, B and C) are invoked independent of the 
depth of the two TGS nodes (A and C) from their common ancestor (B). This 
scenario is expressed in the following steps (Figure 5). 
1. Client ---t KDC: c, tgsa 
2. KDC ---t Client: Ke,tg.a, Ce,tg.a 
3. Client ---t TGS A: Ae,tgsa, Ke,tg.a, Ce,tgsa, S 
4. TGS A ---t TGS B: Ke,tgsb, Ce,tg.b 
Here 
Cc,tgsb == {Tc,tgsb} r , b c, gs 
where 
l ' - ( y )X,g,a+kc"9'b c,tg.b = Yc tgs. 
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Fig. 5. Authentication with globalized keys 
5. TGS A -+ Client: /{e,tgsb 
6. Client -+ TGS B: Ae,tgsa 
where 
Ae,tgsa == (Ytgsa Ke,tgsbt c 
7. TGS B -+ TGS C: Ke,tgses, Ce,tgses 
The TGS B computes 
D - (Y. l,1 )Xt9.b tgsb,tgsa = tgsa l\e,tgsb 
and recreates the key 
re,tgsb == Ae,tgsa Dtgsb,t!lsa 
in order to decipher Ce,tgsb into Te,tgsb' 
TGS B then renames the ticket into Te,tgses and enciphers it as 
Ce,tgses == {Te,tgses Ilke,tgses}r t c, gscs 
where 
= (y Y. Y )x tg.b+kc,tgoc. r e,tgses - e tgse s 
8. TGS B --+ Client: Ke,tgses 
9. TGS C --+ Server: Ke,tgses, Ce,tgses, Dtgse,tgsb 
where 
D - (Y i" )x t9oc tgse,tgsb = tgsb \e,tgses 
10. Client -+ Server: Ac,tgsb 
where 
The Server then computes 
and recreates the key 
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in order to decipher Cc,tgscs into {Tc,tgscsllkc,tgscs} 
11. Server -+ Client: {timestamp + I} r.,c 
7 Security achieved 
One of the primary motivating reasons for employing the cryptosystem of [14] is 
its strength against chosen ciphertext attacks [20]. In such an attack the attacker 
has access to the deciphering algorithm and can feed the algorithm with any 
input ciphertext in order to obtain its corresponding original plaintext. From 
these matching instances the attacker can then obtain information to finally 
cryptanalyze and break a given ciphertext. 
The cryptosystem is promising because it has been show in [14] to be secure, 
not only against chosen ciphertext attacks, but further against adaptively chosen 
ciphertext attacks. In this type of attacks the attacker is permitted to select the 
input ciphertext which are correlated to the target ciphertext. Hence, the attacker 
continues to have access to the enciphering algorithm even after the attacker has 
the target ciphertext. Clearly, the attacker is not permitted to feed the target 
ciphertext into the deciphering algorithm. 
In our mode of usage of the cryptosystem, the weakest point in the scheme 
is equivalent to solving instances of the discrete logarithm problem [21]. More 
specifically, in attempting to obtain any secret key that participated in the cre-
ation of an authenticator, a descriptor or a selector the attacker is faced with 
solving a discrete logarithm problem. In attempting to obtain the plaintext ticket 
from any given ciphertext, the attacker must break the cryptosystem. 
8 Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed the authentication services as found in the J( u-
peree. Kuperee is based on the recent public key cryptosystem of [14], which has 
been shown to be secure against the adaptatively chosen ciphertext attacks. The 
protocol has subtle features, such as the binding together of two entities by a 
third entity, leading to the need of equal co-operation by the two entities in or-
der to complete the authentication procedure. Furthermore, it allows a Client to 
use a multi-service ticket to access multiple services offered by different Servers. 
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This removes the need of the Client to consult the TGS each time it needs a 
service from a Server. In addition, this allows an increased level of parallelism 
in which several Servers may be concurrently executing applications on behalf 
of a single Client. Hierarchical inter-realm authentication has been illustrated 
by way of two protocols based on the localized and globalized arrangement of 
keys. In general public key cryptography provides the advantage of one-to-one 
secure and authentic communications between entities in the system, something 
which is not immediately available to approaches based on private key cryptog-
raphy. Our selection of the cryptosystem of [14] is motivated not only by its high 
level of security, but also by the ease at which session key compositions can be 
created. The use of public key cryptography also has the advantage in that the 
trusted authorities can be implemented with less trust since they only maintain 
the publicly-known keys [13]. This offers considerable benefit over systems such 
as Kerberos which are based on private key cryptography, since in these systems 
the compromise of a trusted authority leads to the capture of all the private keys 
of entities which are held by the trusted authority. The protocols in the current 
work represents a step towards solutions based on the mixture of private key' 
and public key cryptography (such as in [5]), combining the advantages of both 
philosophies. 
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